Based on data from a nationally representative sample collected in the days following the government's visit to America, Tisza continues to lead, but while its base has not grown in the past four months, Fidesz has increased its core voters by 9 percentage points since summer. Orbán would be supported by roughly the same number of people for another four years as those who would remove him, but those not yet ready to choose a party generally feel closer to the opposition narrative. Surprisingly, 70% of Hungarians believe they encountered fake news in the past month, and even ruling party voters consider energy security more important than military defense.
Among certain party voters, Tisza's support dropped from 52% to 47%, while Fidesz support rose from 38% to 42%, still representing a 5 percentage-point Tisza advantage. However, in the general population, Minerva surveys show Tisza's base has remained unchanged since June (35.8%), while those preferring Fidesz grew from 23% to 32.4%. Meanwhile, other party voters declined by 2.8 percentage points and undecided voters fell by 7.7 percentage points—meaning Fidesz primarily recruited from among the undecided.
55% of those planning to vote for Tisza clearly come from the former opposition base, having never voted for Fidesz. Regarding the 40% who have previously voted for the current ruling party, we cannot determine when they did so, thus cannot definitively claim they left Fidesz because of Tisza, but it is likely that a significant share of these voters have conservative values.
The largest and sharpest difference of opinion emerged on whether respondents would like Orbán Viktor to lead the country for another four years. Fidesz supporters overwhelmingly said yes, Tisza supporters said no, with slightly higher uncertainty ("don't know") among the latter. Supporters of other parties and those undecided in their party choice tend to agree with Tisza voters on this question, suggesting that Fidesz's mobilization campaign has difficulty reaching a larger base. The final result on this question was perfect parity: while 20% did not express an opinion, the rest split 40-40% between keeping or removing the prime minister.
Since many believe this group will decide the election, several questions targeted this investigation of how party-undecided and non-disclosing voters lean toward the major parties. One question asked which party respondents would bet would win, and what they thought an arbitrary neighbor would vote for.
Fidesz narrowly won the betting game: Tisza voters overwhelmingly expect Tisza to win, Fidesz voters nearly 100% bet on Fidesz, with the difference appearing among the other groups—other party voters and the undecided: they see Fidesz as more likely to win, but very high shares (39% and 66% respectively) cannot choose who they would bet on.
Perceptions about neighbors aligned with party sympathy; certain party voters also think their neighbors share similar views (only 10.4% of Fidesz voters thought their neighbor votes for Tisza, and only 12.1% of Tisza voters guessed their neighbor votes for Fidesz). Undecided voters and other party supporters are slightly more likely to suspect a Fidesz voter behind the neighbor's door than a Tisza supporter, but they had extremely high rates of "don't know" responses.
A series of questions also sought to explore the secondary preferences of the undecided by asking them to choose the more important in opposing pairs: which is Hungary's bigger problem—migration or corruption, division or foreign influence—and is it more important to cut taxes or raise pensions, or is energy security or military defense more important?
Generally speaking, Fidesz voters consider problems that fit the Fidesz narrative as more serious, while the other three groups lean the opposite direction. This somewhat conflicts with the energy security versus military defense question, where even 61.5% of Fidesz voters prefer energy security, in complete agreement with the other three groups.
About two-thirds of Tisza voters primarily get news online, and only 11% from traditional media. In contrast, 42% of Fidesz voters use traditional media, and only 26% follow online content. Nearly 90% of Tisza sympathizers encounter civic content on social media, compared to only 55% of Fidesz supporters.
This result correlates with voters' age distribution, as older people use traditional media more, and Fidesz derives much of its support from this age group.
Generally, a very high percentage of respondents, 70%, answered clearly yes to whether they encountered content in the past month that they considered false, manipulated, or "fake news," while 20% said no. 93% of Tisza supporters encountered the phenomenon, an overwhelming share, but even among Fidesz voters, 57% suspect fake news.
The survey was conducted November 10-12, 2025. Respondents were reached through randomly generated mobile phone numbers, and the AI assistant conducting the call clearly identified itself as a robot at the outset. The 1,000-person sample of those 18 and older was statistically weighted according to KSH's 2022 census data, accounting for gender and age distribution.
The survey can be analyzed further:
▶ Response database (XLSX)
▶ Analysis results (XLSX)
▶ Research methodology